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 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature Of The Case 
 
 George Albert Shuck, Jr., appeals from the judgment of conviction entered 
upon his conditional guilty plea to felony driving under the influence.  Shuck 
contends the district court erred in rejecting his argument that one of the Arizona 
statutes under which he was previously convicted for driving under the influence 
is not substantially conforming for purposes of the felony enhancement in Idaho.   
 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
 
The state charged Shuck with felony driving under the influence (“DUI”).  
(R., pp.12-14, 20-23.)  Shuck’s two prior convictions, which resulted in the felony 
enhancement, occurred in Arizona.  (R., p.23.)  Shuck filed a “Motion in Limine to 
Exclude Predicate DUI Prior,” asserting that one of his Arizona convictions did 
not qualify for use in the enhancement because the applicable statute did not 
“substantially conform to Idaho’s DUI statute.”  (R., p.34.)  More specifically, 
Shuck argued that the statute was not substantially conforming because it 
included an element that enhanced the DUI to a felony based on the fact that 
Shuck committed the offense while driving on a suspended license from a prior 
DUI.  (R., pp.41-45.)  The district court denied Shuck’s motion after which Shuck 
pled guilty, reserving his right to challenge the district court’s ruling.  (R., pp.77-
91, 94-101, 109-110.)  The court imposed a unified ten-year sentence, with three 
years fixed, and retained jurisdiction.  (R., pp.117-119.)  Shuck timely appealed.  
(R., pp.112-113, 122-125.) 
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ISSUE 
 
 Shuck states the issue on appeal as: 
Whether the district court erred in concluding A.R.S. § 28-1383 is 
substantially conforming to I.C. § 18-8004. 
 
(Appellant’s Brief, p.3.) 
 
 
 The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
 
Given that Shuck is “mindful” that the law does not support his assertion 
that the district court erred in finding that the Arizona statute under which he was 
previously convicted of driving under the influence is substantially conforming for 
purposes of an enhancement in Idaho, and given that Shuck has not argued, 
much less established, that controlling precedent should be overruled, has 
Shuck failed to show that the district court erred? 
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ARGUMENT 
 
The District Court Correctly Concluded That The Arizona Statute Under Which 
Shuck Was Previously Convicted For Driving Under The Influence Is 
Substantially Conforming For Purposes Of The Idaho Felony Enhancement 
 
A. Introduction 
 
The district court ruled that the DUI conviction Shuck challenged qualified 
as a substantially conforming conviction for purposes of enhancing Shuck’s DUI 
charge in this case to a felony pursuant to I.C. §§ 18-8005(6) and (10).  Shuck 
acknowledges on appeal that he is “mindful” that the law does not support any 
claim of error by the district court, but he “[n]evertheless . . . maintains that 
A.R.S. § 28-1383(A)(1) is not substantially conforming with I.C. § 18-8004 
because the Arizona statute requires proof that the defendant’s driver’s license 
was suspended at the time he was driving under the influence, and has no 
counterpart in Idaho’s statutory scheme.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.4.)  Application of 
the correct legal standards supports the district court’s determination that the 
applicable Arizona statutes are “substantially conforming.”  
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 “The determination of whether a foreign criminal violation is substantially 
conforming is a question of law to be determined by the court.”  I.C. § 18-
8005(10).  The construction and application of a statute also presents a question 
of law, over which the appellate courts exercise free review.  State v. Moore, 148 
Idaho 887, 897, 231 P.3d 532, 542 (Ct. App. 2010); State v. Schmoll, 144 Idaho 
800, 803, 172 P.3d 555, 558 (Ct. App. 2007). 
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C. Comparison Of The Challenged Arizona DUI Statute With Idaho’s DUI 
Statute Shows The Two Statutes Are “Substantially Conforming” 
 
Of the two prior Arizona convictions the state alleged to enhance Shuck’s 
DUI to a felony, Shuck challenged the conviction entered on May 1, 2008.  (See 
R., pp.23 (alleging aggravated DUI conviction in Arizona), 42-44 (discussing 
Arizona’s aggravated DUI statute).)  That conviction was the result of a charge of 
aggravated driving under the influence where the aggravating factor was that 
Shuck committed the DUI while driving with a license that was suspended due to 
a DUI conviction from 2007.  (See R., pp.95-96.)  The relevant Arizona statute 
provides, in relevant part, that a person is guilty of aggravated DUI if he commits 
a DUI pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 28-1381 or 28-1382 “while the person’s driver 
license or privilege to drive is suspended, canceled, revoked or refused or while 
a restriction is placed on the person’s driver license or privilege to drive as a 
result of violating section 28-1381 or 28-1382 or under section 28-1385.”  A.R.S. 
§ 28-1383(A)(1).  Section 28-1382, A.R.S., in turn provides, in pertinent part: 
A. It is unlawful for a person to drive or be in actual physical control 
of a vehicle in this state if the person has an alcohol concentration 
as follows within two hours of driving or being in actual physical 
control of the vehicle and the alcohol concentration results from 
alcohol consumed either before or while driving or being in actual 
physical control of the vehicle: 
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1.  0.15 or more but less than 0.20.[1]  
 
2. 0.20 or more. 
 
Idaho Code § 18-8005(10) specifically defines “a substantially conforming 
foreign criminal violation” for the purpose of I.C. § 18-8005(6) as follows: 
 For the purpose of subsections (4), (6) and (9) of [section 
18-8005] and the provisions of section 18-8004C, Idaho Code, a 
substantially conforming foreign criminal violation exists when a 
person has pled guilty to or has been found guilty of a violation of 
any federal law or law of another state, or any valid county, city, or 
town ordinance of another state substantially conforming to the 
provisions of section 18-8004, Idaho Code.  The determination of 
whether a foreign criminal violation is substantially conforming is a 
question of law to be determined by the court. 
  
I.C. § 18-8005(10) (emphasis added).   
Pursuant to the plain language of this statute, a court determining whether 
a foreign DUI conviction qualifies as “a substantially conforming foreign criminal 
violation” must compare the provisions of the foreign law to which the defendant 
pled guilty or was found guilty of violating with the provisions of I.C. § 18-8004, 
which set forth the elements of DUI in Idaho.  See also State v. Moore, 148 
Idaho 887, 898, 231 P.3d 532, 543 (Ct. App. 2010); State v. Schmoll, 144 Idaho 
800, 803, 172 P.3d 555, 558 (Ct. App. 2007).  If the provisions of the foreign law 
                                            
1 The “Felony Indictment” filed in relation to Shuck’s May 1, 2008 judgment 
alleges, in Count II, that Shuck “drove a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol 
content of .15% or more while his license was suspended or revoked,” in 
violation of A.R.S. § 28-1382(A).  (Exhibit 2, p.2.)  Count I of the same indictment 
also alleges that Shuck drove under the influence on the same date, citing 
A.R.S. § 28-1381 (as opposed to A.R.S. § 28-1382), without any reference to 
Shuck’s blood alcohol content.  (Exhibit 2, p.1.)  Although not entirely clear, it 
appears that Shuck was charged with two counts for the same incident because 
the first alleged a general DUI, and the second count was for the purpose of 
alleging the DUI was committed “under the extreme influence.”       
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“substantially conform” to the provisions of I.C. § 18-8004 (i.e., the elements of 
DUI in the foreign state substantially conform to the elements of DUI in Idaho), 
the foreign conviction is a “substantially conforming foreign criminal violation” as 
a matter of law. 
 The district court compared Arizona’s DUI  statute to Idaho’s DUI statute 
and found “the only difference” between the two “is that the Arizona statute has a 
two-hour time limit and a requirement that the accused must have consumed the 
alcohol prior to driving.”  (R., p.6.)  The district court noted, however, that the 
Court of Appeals, in Moore, supra, rejected the argument that these differences 
preclude a finding that the statute was substantially conforming.  (R., p.99.)  
Specifically, the Court in Moore concluded that, even though North Dakota’s DUI 
statute also included the requirement that the defendant have a particular blood 
alcohol concentration as measured by a test performed within two hours of 
driving, the statute still substantially conformed to Idaho’s DUI statute because 
both statutes “prohibit the same essential conduct-driving while under the 
influence of alcohol and frame their prohibitions using the same language, 
requiring substantially conforming elements to be met to sustain a violation.”  
Moore, 148 Idaho at 897-898, 231 P.3d at 542-543 (quoting Schmoll, 144 Idaho 
at 804, 172 P.3d at 559); see also State v. Juarez, 155 Idaho 449, 452, 313 P.3d 
777, 780 (Ct. App. 2013) (also rejecting argument that Nevada statute and Idaho 
statute not substantially conforming based on two-hour requirement in Nevada 
statute). 
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 Shuck does not contend that the district court erred in finding that the 
Arizona and Idaho statutes are substantially conforming as it relates to the two-
hour time limit or the requirement of prior consumption.  (See generally 
Appellant’s Brief, p.4.)  To the contrary, Shuck acknowledges that if the same 
essential conduct is prohibited – driving while under the influence – the statutes 
are substantially conforming.  (Appellant’s Brief, p.4.)  Instead, Shuck argues, as 
he did below, that “A.R.S. § 28-1383(A)(1) is not substantially conforming with 
I.C. § 18-8004 because the Arizona statute requires proof that the defendant’s 
driver’s license was suspended at the time he was driving under the influence, 
and has no counterpart in Idaho’s statutory scheme.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.4.)  
Shuck, however, also acknowledges that this difference is irrelevant to an 
analysis of whether the statutes are substantially conforming.  (Appellant’s Brief, 
p.4.)  As correctly noted by the district court, the fact that Arizona enhances a 
DUI to an aggravated DUI if the DUI is committed while the defendant is driving 
on a suspended license as a result of a prior DUI does not change the fact that 
the underlying prohibited conduct – driving under the influence – is the same 
and, therefore, substantially conforming.  (R., pp.99-100.)   
 In light of Shuck’s concession that the law does not support his claim, and 
because Shuck has failed to assert, much less establish, that existing precedent 
should be overruled, he has failed to meet his burden of showing error.  See 
State v. Koivu, 152 Idaho 511, 518, 272 P.3d 483, 490 (2012) (citations omitted) 
(“We will ordinarily not overrule one of our prior opinions unless it is shown to 
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have been manifestly wrong, or the holding in the case has proven over time to 
be unwise or unjust.”).   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered 
upon Shuck’s conviction for felony DUI. 
 DATED this 9th day of September, 2016. 
      /s/ Jessica M. Lorello_______________ 
      JESSICA M. LORELLO 
      Deputy Attorney General 
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